From the New York Times Opinionator blog:
This week marks the last sessions of my Yale law school class on law, liberalism and religion. In the course of the semester my students have learned how to read religion clause cases against the background of long-standing debates in philosophy and theology about the relationship between religious imperatives and the obligations of democratic citizenship. They have become adept at recognizing the arguments behind the arguments the justices are making explicitly. They can see how a case ostensibly about vouchers or school prayer or Christmas trees on courthouse steps is really about whether principle or history should inform a court’s decisions. They can see how a case about head coverings or beards in the military (a topic that has surfaced once again) turns on the distinctions set down in John Locke’s “Letter Concerning Toleration” (1689), a tract the justices may never have read. They can see how the majority and dissenting opinions in a free exercise case often reflect a tension between negative and positive liberty as these terms are defined by Isaiah Berlin, an author the justices will likely not have referenced. They can see how the entire history of religion-clause jurisprudence at once illustrates and is an extended critique of John Rawls’s attempt in “Political Liberalism” to devise a form of government that will be fair to religion while at the same time keeping it at arm’s length.
Fish goes on to say that skills and tricks of the trade should not be the point of advanced study but rather deep understanding of the nature of the game being played. In cultures dominated by cheerleading for entrepreneurial capitalism that commitment to depth of study must struggle hard to maintain itself against the tide favoring tricks for short-term success.
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From Katherine Long in the Seattle Times:
From the journal
From Declan Butler in Nature:
From an editorial in Nature:
From
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